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Thomas dean
In part one of this essay we looked at certain second-order issues in 
Abe’s approach to Zen and Western thought, namely, his under­
standing of the nature, goal and resources available for cross-cultural 
encounter in philosophy. We shall now look at the first-order language 
and concepts Abe uses in formulating his Zen philosophy and critique 
of Western thought. We shall look in particular at the implications of 
his use of traditional Western metaphysical terminology to clarify his 
Zen philosophy, and his subsequent use of that Zen philosophy to criti­
que the very tradition from which he derives his terms. Our question 
will be: Does Abe’s procedure open him to a philosophical rejoinder 
from recent developments in Western thought, especially Heidegger?
We will look first at the metaphysics presupposed in Abe’s version of 
Zen thought. Is Abe’s “Zen” critique of Western thought itself tradi­
tionally Western-metaphysical in nature? (V)
We will then examine what the critique of traditional Western 
metaphysics by newer movements in Western philosophy means for 
Abe’s project. Does it call into question Abe’s Zen philosophy insofar 
as it depends on a Western conceptual tradition that is itself under at­
tack? Does it call into question Abe’s critique of Western thought 
itself? (VI)
Next we will consider whether contemporary Western thought con­
tains more resources than Abe’s critique suggests. If so, can it con­
tribute to rethinking problems in Abe’s Zen philosophy that arise in 
the course of his dialogue with Western thought? (VII)
We shall conclude with a look at a different but equally important 
aspect of the dialogue between Zen and Western thought—the religio- 
experiential as distinct from the philosophico-ontological dimension of 




My initial claim is that the Western thought which is the object of 
Abe’s critique and in part the source of concepts he uses in his Zen criti­
que is restricted to what Heidegger calls the “onto-theo-logical” tradi­
tion of Western thought. He has a traditional-metaphysical view of (A) 
epistemological and anthropological phenomena (subject-object con­
sciousness, the self), and (B) ontological terms (being, time, truth, reali­
ty).
A.
Abe’s understanding and critique of Western thought is cast in 
epistemological and anthropological terms deeply rooted in a tradi­
tional Western onto-theo-logical framework. We shall look at Abe’s 
understanding of (1) the subject-object structure of consciousness, and 
the corollary concept of the self; (2) the objectifying nature of con­
cepts, thought, and language; and (3) the possibility of access to reality 
as it is in itself, to things as they really are.
1. Subject-Object, the I, the Self
(i) In the ambiguous phenomenon of self-consciousness there are, ac­
cording to Abe, two Ts’. There is the ‘I’ which is the object of self- 
awareness and which, in moments of self-conscious reflection, is 
distinguished from all other Ts’ (as ‘others’) and indeed from all other 
‘objects’ which are not this ‘subject’. Abe calls this ‘I’, which is the ‘ob­
ject’ of self-consciousness, the ego self. There is also the T’ which is the 
active subject of the act of self-consciousness, and which can never be 
reduced to the object of an act of self-consciousness. In the moment 
that, as the subject of an act of self-consciousness at tB it is made 
the object of a new act of self-conscious reflection at t2, it will, as the 
subject of that new act at t2, already have eluded its own grasp. Abe 
calls this T, which is the ever-receding, ungraspable subject of self­
consciousness, the true self. It is the actually existing self, as distinct 
from the epistemological self-as-object of the subject-object distinc­
tion (6; 276 n.2). This gap between the ego self and the true self is not 
accidental but inherent to the subject-object structure of conscious-
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ness (6). In this subject-object structure of human self-consciousness, 
we not only look at all other entities, whether persons or things, “ob­
jectively”, that is, “from the outside, not from within”; we even look 
at ourselves “from the outside”. The self-as-object, the ego-self, is not 
a ‘self’ or ‘subject’ in the primordial metaphysical sense (5; 223).
(ii) The true self, the ‘I’ or self as “the genuine Subject”, “must 
always stand ‘behind’, ever eluding our grasp” (6). As already noted, 
any attempt to grasp the true, existing self in an act of epistemic objec­
tification leads to an endless, infinite regression (8). From the stand­
point of the subject-object structure of consciousness, we seem compell­
ed to accept the fundamental “unattainability of the true Self’ (8). 
But, says Abe, this subject-object structure of consciousness is the 
epistemological foundation and presupposition of the entire Western 
metaphysical tradition. From the Zen perspective, therefore, it would 
appear that the Western tradition is confronted by a koan that it is 
unable to solve: the self is not-self, to which the Zen answer is: the not- 
self as self!
(iii) The Zen resolution of this Western impasse requires an overcom­
ing of the subject-object structure of self-consciousness and its replace­
ment by a transformed and direct realization of the true Self. The col­
lapse of the effort to identify the ego self with one’s true self is the first 
step in this process (7; 226). In the second step, even the distinction be­
tween seif-as-subject and self-as-object, “between ‘seer’ and ‘the seen’, 
the realm of ‘I’ and the realm of ‘Reality’ ”, is overcome (12).
(iv) Abe characterizes this second step as the “movement from the 
realization (A) that the true self is unattainable, to the realization (B) 
that the unattainable itself is the true self’ (11). He speaks of an “im­
mediate realization” of this ‘unattainable” self (196). By ‘immediate’ 
or ‘direct* he means that this realization is not an ‘objectified’ or ‘objec­
tifying’ awareness of a ‘something’ which is thereby ‘objectified’. The 
true self is ‘unobjectifiable’ (ibid.). How can we have an immediate or 
direct realization of that which is said to be endlessly elusive, 
ungraspable, unattainable? Behind these paradoxical utterances is 
Abe’s ontology of the Self as Absolute Subject, Absolute Subjectivity. 
The Self is that absolute “ ‘Mind’, ‘Seeing’, ‘Knowing’, ‘Activity’ ” 
which exists prior to and in turn grounds the subject-object structure 
of self-consciousness. The Self is “the absolute Subjectivity at the 
root-source of human objectification” (74). Unobjectifiable and ab-
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solute, “pure Seeing” is “causa sui and completely free in the sense of 
*What-it-is-that-thus-comes’ ’ (67).
In view of Heidegger's attack on the onto-theo-logical concept of the 
Self as pure Subject or transcendental Subjectivity, Abe’s concept of 
the true self would seem, at first glance, problematic. Must not this 
“Zen” concept of the Self which Abe uses to criticize the subject-ob­
ject structure of the Western tradition be itself subjected to a Heideg- 
gerian critique?
Several questions could perhaps be raised:
(1) Grammatically, the lexical indicator ‘I’, when used as the subject 
of the sentence, does not perform the same role as the ‘I* in the object 
of the sentence (“I am asking, ‘Who am I*?”). But does this entitle us 
to draw ontological conclusions about the intrinsic ungraspability, 
unattainability, of the T? One thinks of Wittgenstein’s analysis of 
private language. Does the grammatical fact that “you cannot feel my 
toothache” suggest there is a realm of private experience that is forever 
beyond the cognitive grasp of another self? Similarly, does the gram­
matical fact that “I can never really grasp myself in the act of having a 
toothache” suggest that the Self which “has” or “experiences” that 
toothache is really epistemically inaccessible to itself? Don’t these con­
undrums simply result from mistaking grammatical tautologies for pro­
found epistemological or ontological truths?
(2) Another difficulty with Abe’s Zen alternative is that it is forced by 
its own logic (its critique of any “objectifying” of the Self viewed as ab­
solute Subject) to use mostly negative terms to characterize the positive 
substance of its “positionless position”. Terms like “absolute”, 
“immediate”, or “non-objectifiable” are parasitic on their positive 
counterparts. But as Heidegger points out in his response to Sartre— 
who saw “existentialism” as reversing the metaphysical proposition, 
“essence precedes existence” to read: “existence precedes essence”— 
the negation of a metaphysical proposition is still a metaphysical 
proposition, and remains caught in the onto-theo-logical tradition it 
is attempting to criticize. Such is the case, I suggest, with Abe’s char­
acterization of the true Self as “absolute” Subject and “non-objectifi- 
able” Subjectivity, despite his dialectic of double-negation.
(3) Even if we were to grant that Abe’s concept of the true self as ab­
solute subjectivity could somehow escape the force of a Wittgenstei- 
nian or Heideggerian critique, there remains the problem of explaining
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how and why it is that this pure activity of Seeing, which is prior to the 
distinction of seer and seen, this absolute Subjectivity which precedes 
the distinction of subject and object in (ego) self-consciousness—how 
and why this pure activity gives rise to the structure and subsequent ac­
tivity of subject-object consciousness. Abe claims that it does, but 
nowhere explains how or why. He gives no account of the transcenden­
tal “constitution” or phenomenological “genesis” of subject-object 
consciousness out of this prior activity of “pure” Subjectivity. By con- 
strast, Heidegger, in his critique of the transcendental subject of 
Western onto-theo-logy, has given a detailed account of the genesis of 
subject-object consciousness already in his early work, Being and 
Time.
2. Concepts, Thinking, and Language
Abe’s critique of the “objectifying” nature of ordinary (ego) self­
consciousness and his appeal to a “non-objectifying” or “pure” activi­
ty of Mind, Seeing, Knowing or Subjectivity as true Self carries over to 
his view of such phenomena as the conceiving, thinking and speaking 
associated with subject-object consciousness. These, too, he contrasts 
to ways of conceiving, thinking and speaking which are “pure” or 
“non-objectifying”.
(i) Conceptualization. With the overcoming of the subject-object 
distinction characteristic of ordinary self-consciousness, we overcome 
the duality of subject and object—that is, we overcome not only the no­
tion of the self as ego, as subject of this dualistic structure of self-con­
sciousness, we also overcome the notion of the objects of such con­
sciousness, of things as objects of the subject of such consciousness. 
Thus we are freed to see things as they really are in themselves (5-8). 
The acts of conceptualization that lead to the differentiation of subject 
and object represent attempts to objectify not only the true Self but 
also the world of things. The overcoming of such acts of conceptual ob­
jectification leads to the direct realization of “the non-differentiated 
sameness—which is at once the clearest differentiation—of ultimate 
Reality”, where things are disclosed as they really are in themselves, 
free of the objectifying, or differentiating, or “dualistic” structure of 
subject-object consciousness (12). In saying that the distinction of 
‘seer’ and ‘seen* is overcome, Abe is also saying that the dualistic 
differentiation of ultimate Reality from ultimate Subjectivity is likewise
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overcome—-so that Reality is seen as it really is, in itself, free of the ob­
jectifications of our conceptual processes (10, 17). When we concep­
tualize things, we can then understand them “only insofar as they are 
objectified and not as they are in themselves" (217). Zen, by contrast, 
approaches things non-conceptually (17).
(ii) Thinking. Thinking that proceeds on the basis of such acts of con­
ceptual or cognitive differentiation Abe calls substantive thinking: 
“substantive thinking objectifies and substantializes things” (102,112). 
The “ultimate thinking” that characterizes his Zen philosophical stand­
point is, by contrast to our ordinary, subject-object thinking, a kind of 
“non-thinking”, thinking which “transcends thinking in the usual 
sense” (112). It represents “a fundamental critique of the nature of 
thinking asserting that human thinking is essentially a substantive 
one” (ibid.). Zen’s ‘non-thinking’ represents the overcoming of the 
“dualistic and discriminative” nature of our normal, subject-object 
structure of consciousness (ibid.). Zen philosophy, says Abe, “is a 
philosophy based on ‘non-thinking’ which is beyond both thinking and 
not thinking” (xxi); it is an ultimate or absolute thinking which 
“transcends both relative thinking and relative not-thinking” (112). It 
is a thinking which allows things to be disclosed as they really are, as 
they are in themselves, not as the ‘objects’ of thinking grounded in our 
ordinary, subject-object structured consciousness.
(iii) Language. If things as they really are, in themselves, elude the 
conceptual grasp of an objectifying, substantializing way of thinking, 
then they cannot be made the objects of ordinary propositional asser­
tion. When the true Self says that “Mountains are really mountains, 
waters are really waters”, it is not talking objectively about things. It 
is, says Abe, the true Self talking about itself. Nor, on the other hand, 
are such statements about mountains and waters symbolic assertions 
about the Self: “rather the true Self is talking about mountains and 
waters as its own Reality" (16). It is talking, paradoxically, in a non-ob­
jectifying, non-conceptual way that transcends words, transcends 
language. It is a kind of ultimate non-talking, an absolute non-speech, 
that is nonetheless not to be confused with either symbolic utterance or 
silence: “since Zen is concerned with the truly unspeakable, it rejects 
not only speech, but mere silence as well” (22). Just as Zen thinking is 
ultimate thinking-as-non-thinking, Zen speech is ultimate speech, a 
non-speaking that transcends relative speaking and relative non-speak-
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ing (silence), speech and silence, in their usual sense:
Zen always expresses the ‘unspeakable’ Reality which is 
beyond affirmation and negation, speech and silence, in a 
direct and straightforward way, and presses us to present our 
understanding of this Reality through the injunction ‘Speak! 
Speak!’ (22)
3. Things As They Really Are In Themselves.
Underlying these assertions of the objectifying nature of our ordinary 
modes of conceiving, thinking and speaking is Abe’s basic ontological 
doctrine, one which stands in systematic relation to his notion of the 
unobjectifiable nature of ultimate Subjectivity—namely, the unobjec- 
tifiable nature of ultimate Reality. It is this doctrine which allows him 
to distinguish between things as objects of objectifying (substantializ­
ing) concepts, thinking or speech, and things as they really are in them­
selves. “Mountains really are mountains, waters really are waters’’ 
is an assertion free of the dualistic distortions of ordinary conscious­
ness, conceptualization, thought or speech. Abe’s doctrine of the un- 
objectifable nature of ultimate reality is his most fundamental on­
tological assumption.
In the state of ordinary, subject-object consciousness, when moun­
tains are identified as mountains and thereby differentiated from 
waters, and vice versa, “mountains are understood as mountains in 
that they are objectified ... by us, and not understood as mountains in 
themselves, ... ‘Mountains are mountains’ only insofar as they are ob­
jectively looked at from our subjective point of view and are not 
grasped in themselves. .. . There is a duality of subject and object in 
this understanding” (5). By contrast, when the subject-object 
dichotomy is overcome, we not only attain a direct realization of the 
pure Subjectivity that lies at the ground of that dichotomy, we also 
discern that “mountains and waters disclose themselves ... no longer 
as objects from our subjective vantage point” (10). Rather, they 
disclose themselves as they really are, in their ‘Reality’ as ... moun­
tains and waters.
In breaking through the dualistic structure of our subject-object ob­
jectifying consciousness, says Abe, the wall between subject and object 
is overcome, and we attain a direct realization of “the non-differen-
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tiated sameness—which is at once the clearest differentiation—of 
ultimate Reality”. The ultimate Reality of mountains and waters retain 
their differentiated particularity at the same time as they are seen in 
their nondifferentiated sameness with each other and with the true Self. 
It is, to borrow a phrase from Richard DeMartino, a direct realization 
of the nondualistic ‘duality* of mountains and waters, Self and Reali­
ty.
My difficulty here, as also noted in my reservations about Abe’s no­
tion of pure or absolute Subjectivity, is that these “anti-metaphysical” 
utterances remain confined within the precincts of metaphysical 
speech. They do not, despite Abe’s dialectic of double negation, break 
out of the onto-theo-logical problematic of the Western tradition of 
philosophy. Here, too, the negation of a metaphysical proposition, 
even the negation of the negation of a metaphysical proposition, still re­
mains a mode of metaphysical discourse. This point becomes clearer 
when we look at the onto-theo-logical character of Abe’s interpretation 
of being, time, truth, and the nature of metaphysics itself.
B.
1. Metaphysics.
Despite his forceful critique of the metaphysical tradition of the 
West, Abe himself views his Zen “anti-metaphysical” thinking as itself 
a species of metaphysical thinking: it is “a metaphysical standpoint in 
the best sense of the word” (85). In fact, his explicit goal is to “try, on 
the basis of such a metaphysical standpoint, to bring under one pur­
view the philosophical thought of the West and East” (ibid.).
Abe sees his effort as involving an encounter of three metaphysi­
cal principles—the Aristotelian “fundamental principle” of Being, 
the Kantian principle of the Ought, and the Buddhist principle of 
Nothingness as advanced, e.g., by the Indian philosopher, Nagarjuna 
(85-86). Each of these metaphysical principles has “an absolute or 
non-relative character”, “transcending relativity and forming the fun­
damental principle of the possibility of metaphysics” (ibid.). Abe calls 
these three metaphysical principles—Being, Ought, Nothingness— 
“each taken in the absolute sense, the three fundamental categories for 
human thought, and accordingly, for human existence itself” (87). 
And, “Since these three categories each have a transcendental and ab-
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solute element, irreducible either to one another or to anything else, 
these three categories alone can be considered to be truly fundamen­
tal” (ibid.). In other words, for Abe these categories have the onto- 
theo-logical nature and function of traditional metaphysical principles.
First, the nature of metaphysical principles such as Nagarjuna’s 
Nothingness (Abe also uses the German Nichts, the Japanese Afu, the 
Buddhist Sunyata, and the English Emptiness”) is described as: 
“ultimate” or “ultimate Reality” (xxi-xxii, 36); “absolute”, beyond 
the dualism of “relative” being and “relative” non-being (10, 73, 86, 
94); “infinite” (36); “pure”, because “free from discrimination” 
(217-218); “true”, because it discloses all beings as they truly are (10, 
14, 94); “original”, prior to the differentiation of being and non-being, 
and of beings, from one another (16, 17, 33, 225); and, finally, “free”, 
"causa sui” (35-36, 67), that “which spontaneously develops itself’ 
(270). Abe accompanies these ontological predicates with absolutizing 
qualifiers such as “real”, “really”, “true”, “truly”, “very”, “ge­
nuine”, and “nothing but” (cf. 218).
Second, these absolutizing adjectives and adverbs describing the 
metaphysical principle of Nothingness also indicate its ontological and 
epistemological functions.
Metaphysically, these fundamental principles, whether Being, Ought 
or, as in this case, Nothingness, serve the traditional onto-theo-logical 
function of pointing to the metaphysical ground, basis, origin, or 
“root-source” of all beings (14, 16-18, 23, 33, 66, 74, 94, 128, 176). 
For example:
. .. true Emptiness (absolute Nothingness) is absolute Reality 
which makes all phenomena, all existents, truly be. (94)
Thus true Emptiness [absolute Afw] is wondrous Being, ab­
solute U, the fullness and suchness of everything, or tathata\ 
it is ultimate Reality which, being beyond u and mu [relative 
being and relative non-being], lets both u and mu stand and 
work just as they are in their reciprocal relationship. (128)
... in Nirvana everything and everyone are equal and 
returns, through human realization, to oneness as the on­
tological ground prior to their differentiation. ... Nirvana is 
not an objectively observable state but is human realization
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of the ultimate ground of both subject and object, of both 
self and world. (177)
Epistemologically, the principle of Nothingness, which is non-dually 
identical with the “true Self’, serves as the source of subject-object or 
ego-consciousness and hence of the world of differentiated things, and 
as the basis for overcoming these distinctions in the direct realization 
of wondrous Being: “ "Nothingness’ thus made absolute by Nagarjuna 
[is] the basic principle which truly discloses reality as such.. .” (94).
2. Being, Time and Truth.
Behind Abe’s description of the principle of Nothingness lies what 
would also appear to be an onto-theo-logical understanding of being, 
time, truth, and reality.
(1) Being. In addition to ground, source, origin, and basis, "being* 
has other onto-theo-logical significations:
(i) identity: “undifferentiated sameness” (12);
(ii) simplicity: “pure”, “free of discrimination” (217-218);
(iii) unity: “oneness as the ontological ground prior to their 
differentiation” (177);
(iv) infinite, all-embracing, universal existentially, embracing 
all beings: “the "being’ dimension is truly boundless” (35), 
"‘the dimension of being—non-being that is common to all be­
ings” (41), “this infinite, ontological basis common to all be­
ings” (41), “It is "all beings’ in its absolute sense which is 
beyond and freed from the opposition between being and non- 
being” (46);
(v) universal essentially, as “the original, fundamental nature 
of all beings” (33), the Reality in which we are “originally 
and essentially enlightened” (220);
(vi) the fundamental “that-ness” or “as-it-isness” of being- 
as-existence itself: it is “the fullness and suchness of 
everything, or tat hat a" (128); “ ‘everything is empty* may be 
more adequately rendered in this way: ‘Everything is just as it 
is’ ” (223); everything in its suchness is really what it is, “no 
more, no less” (226-227);
(vii) the pure presence of being: “the absolute present" (17), 
the absolute “here and now” (220);
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(viii) pure being prior to becoming,*. “Prior to ‘becoming 
pure’ we are originally and essentially ‘being pure*.... As 
the ground ‘being pure’, Original Purity, can stand without 
‘becoming pure’ ’’ (220, 222);
(ix) aseity*. that from which all else proceeds, itself uncaused, 
self-caused, spontaneous, full, absolute Activity, actus purus 
(66, 220).
To summarize: for Abe, the meaning of ‘being’ bears a remarkable 
resemblance to the traditional Western understanding of Being 
characterized by such onto-theo-logical predicates as: identity, simplici­
ty, unity, universality, totality, essence (the ‘What’ of all beings), ex­
istence (the ‘That’ of all beings), presence, priority to becoming, aseity, 
causa sui, actus purus.
(2) Time. Abe’s concept of being rests on a corresponding concept of 
time like that of the Western onto-theo-logical tradition-pure or ab­
solute presence. This link of being and time is mediated by a twofold 
sense of presence (‘here and now’): “the realization of everything being 
really just as it is . .. takes place in the absolute present” (17). In this 
“moment” of realization even “the implication of temporal sequence” 
(movement from the ‘stage’ of pre-enlightenment to the ‘stage’ of 
enlightenment, for example) is overcome. Such a notion of sequential 
temporality is “illusory”. The realization of the ‘suchness’ of all be­
ings which takes place in the ‘absolute present’ is not an event “in 
time”. Rather, the ‘absolute Present’, “being beyond time, is the 
ground or original basis... from which temporal sequence can 
legitimately begin” (ibid.). This realization of the absolute Present takes 
place in the moment, in any moment. In fact, it involves “the paradox­
ical unity of time and eternity at each and every moment” (55). Thus, 
Abe rejects the notion that our true Self (our “Buddha nature”) is a 
potential to be realized as some future time. It is rather our original 
nature realized in the moment, here and now, of the absolute present 
(61): “the Buddha-nature always manifests itself as time, specifically as 
present time” (62). Abe, with DOgen, rejects those views which “look 
for eternity beyond the present moment” (63). Abe, with DOgen, 
“denies continuity of time and emphasizes the independence of each 
point of time.” Each moment of time enjoys complete, absolute on­
tological independence: time as absolute present is at the same time be­
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ing as absolute presence: “at every moment time fully manifests itself’ 
(64); ‘there is no time that is not also fullness of time” (64-65); ‘all 
times ... manifest eternity. Yet this takes place here and now in the ab­
solute present” (66). We are not “on the way”, “in process toward”, 
our essential Being, our true Self. We “already and always” are, “here 
and now, and only in the here and now”, originally and essentially our 
true Self (219-220).
In sum, for Abe, DOgen’s equation, “being is time, time is being”, is 
to be understood not in Whiteheadian or Heideggerian terms as pro­
cess ontology or ontology of the radical temporality of Being 
(unterwegs zum Sein), but in classic onto-theo-logical terms: Being and 
Time as Absolute Presence and Absolute Present (one thinks, for exam­
ple, of Tillich’s “Eternal Now”).
(3) Truth. Abe also draws on a traditional onto-theo-logical concept 
of ‘truth’: truth as “complete disclosure”.
First, linked to being: commenting on DOgen’s statement about our 
Buddha nature or true Self: “Throughout the universe nothing has 
ever been concealed”, Abe says, “This clearly refers to the complete 
disclosure of ‘all beings’. ..” (36):
When grasped neither in terms of the duality of body and 
soul, nor in terms of the duality of potentiality and actuality, 
all beings manifest themselves right here and now in their 
wholeness, totality, and suchness. This complete disclosure of 
‘all beings’ takes place only in the dehomocentric boundless 
universe which is most fundamental for everything. (277, 
n.14)
Or, linking truth to being as Self: “With this awakening to the true 
Self, ultimate Reality is disclosed in its entirety” (14).
Second, linked to time as absolute present: Abe says that in the mo­
ment of realization “the absolute present is completely disclosed” (17). 
The ‘moment* as absolute present is, in turn, the ‘truth* (complete 
disclosure) of time: “at every moment time/w/(y manifests itself* (64).
Epistemologically, too, while a Western subject-object mode of 
thinking “veilfs] our insight into the nature of life and reality”, in Zen 
all these veils are “swept aside”. Instead we return to the “root-source 
(the true or self-less Self)” which discloses reality as it is in itself, prior 
to our acts of cognitive distortion. In the moment of of insight we 
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realize a truth which is “truly pure because ... free from discrimina­
tion”. In this return to the “root-source” “everything ... is disclosed 
as pure in its original nature”. When we are thus “totally awake”, ge­
nuinely “enlightened”, we see all beings as they really are in 
themselves ... truly: completely disclosed (218).
(4) Reality. As these comments on truth indicate, a corollary of 
Abe’s notion of truth is his notion of what it is that truth discloses: it 
discloses ultimate Reality, the totality of beings, as they really are in 
themselves. The notion of “complete disclosure” (“free of all 
discriminations”) and the notion of beings “as they really are”, “in 
themselves” (“free of all discrimination”) are, finally, synonymous. 
By the ‘reality’ of things we mean not simply their bare existence, their 
mere ‘thatness’ or ‘suchness’, but their ‘being’, their ‘suchness’, their 
‘thatness’ as they truly are, free of any distortion, as they disclose 
themselves to us from themselves, not as we discriminate or differen­
tiate them. In the complete disclosure that is the truth of Zen realiza­
tion, “mountains are affirmed really as mountains, and waters are 
affirmed really as waters in their Reality” (10). Zen achieves the 
“realization of everything being really just as it is” (17). In Zen 
awakening, “everything in the world is real in itself’ (18). “All beings 
can exist respectively as they are” (36). In Nothingness, “everything is 
really as it is” (211). All beings are seen truly, “free of discrimina­
tion”, not as “objectified” by our subject-object (“impure”) con­
sciousness, but “as they are in themselves” (“pure”) (217):
This is why ‘Emptiness’ is also called as-it-is-ness or suchness. 
Emptiness is not a mere emptiness, but rather fullness in 
which the distinctness of everything is realized in a 
thoroughgoing manner. (247)
In calling attention to these facts, I have not looked at Abe’s use of 
the principle of Nothingness in his dialectic of affirmation through the 
negation of negation on which he rests his case for having overcome 
the traditional Western assignment of priority to being over nonbeing. 
It is possible that he would view this dialectic as also being a critique of 
the onto-theo-logical understanding of being, time and truth which I 
have ascribed to him. I am arguing, however, that the onto-theo- 
logical nature of the underlying rhetoric and assumptions which sup­
port his philosophy in fact constitutes a “metaphysical form” which 
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deconstructs the “anti-metaphysical content** of his first-order claims. 
To develop this point further it will be necessary to conduct a more 
direct Auseinandersetzung or dialogue between Abe’s onto-theo- 
logical reading of Zen and the post-onto-theo-logical thinking of re­
cent Western thinkers, Heidegger in particular. If I am correct, a criti­
que of Abe’s Zen philosophy would mean a critique of his critique of 
Western thought as well.
VI
We may begin this dialogue by looking at some of the differences 
Abe finds between his Zen philosophy and Western thought. My argu­
ment will be twofold: first, that some of these differences may conceal 
similarities which call into question critical conclusions Abe draws con­
cerning the superiority of Zen philosophy in those instances. Second, 
that the cases of genuine difference may be different than Abe says, 
such that critical evaluation in those cases may lead to an opposite con­
clusion, namely, the possible superiority of Western thought to Zen 
philosophy. At the very least there may be room and need for more 
discussion before evaluative conclusions can be drawn.
1. The difference between Zen and Western concepts of ‘Nothing­
ness* and ‘Being’.
Abe believes that the Buddhist principle of Nothingness is on­
tologically irreducible to the Western categories of Being or Ought. 
These concepts are embedded in doctrinal structures that entail further 
systematic differences between Zen philosophy and Western thought 
(xxi-xxii, 188). These conceptual and systematic differences are 
reflected in difficulties of translation from East-Asian to Western 
systems of language and thought.
Take first the concept of Nothingness, in Japanese: mu, in its ab­
solute sense, Mu: "mu, which stands for the English term ‘non-being’, 
has an important connotation which is different from ‘non-being’ ’’ 
(281, n.3). In part, this may be because this ontological concept arises 
out of an attempt to express a quite different religious or existential ex­
perience, for Abe claims that “the negativity of human life is felt more 
seriously and deeply in Buddhism than among the followers of Western 
intellectual traditions” (130):
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The difference between Western intellectual traditions and 
Buddhism in their understanding of negativity in human life 
involves not only an ontological issue but also an existential 
and soteriological one. (131)
Zen terms containing ‘nothingness’ (mu) “probably cannot be ade­
quately rendered into any European language because there is nothing 
in the Western way of thinking corresponding to them” (284, n.21). 
Similarly, of the Zen word for Being, w, in its absolute sense as ‘won­
drous Being’, U, Abe says: “the Buddhist idea of wondrous Being is ab­
solutely different from the idea of ‘Being* understood as ultimate Reali­
ty in the West” (130).
The main reason for the difference of Zen Nothingness and Zen Be­
ing from Western Nonbeing and Western Being, says Abe, is that the 
latter are understood dualistically or dialectically, whereas in Zen: 
“True Emptiness [Mu] and wondrous Being [</] are completely non- 
dualistic: absolute Mu and ultimate Reality [C/1 are totally identical” 
(ibid.). In the Western tradition Being is dualistically conceived vis-a- 
vis Nonbeing, and Being is not “realized” through the prior realization 
of Nonbeing: “It is not considered to be beyond the antinomy of being 
and non-being but rather gains its ultimate status by virtue of its being 
metaphysically prior to non-being” (ibid.). In the Zen understanding, 
on the other hand:
mu is not one-sidedly derived through negation of u. Mu is 
the negation of u and vice versa. One has no logical or on­
tological priority to the other. Being the complete counter­
concept to w, mu is more than privation of u, a stronger form 
of negativity than ‘non-being’ as understood in the West. 
(127)
The Buddhist concept of Nothingness, therefore, represents “overcom­
ing that antinomic, self-contradictory oneness of u and mu.... u and 
mu are paradoxically and self-contradictorily identical” (128-129). 
Clearly, mu and u are not adequately rendered by Western philoso­
phy’s terms, ‘being’ and ‘non-being*.
What evaluative conclusions does Abe draw from this ontological 
and linguistic-conceptual incommensurability? First, that “Emptiness 
replaces God” (167). Second, that, on the one hand, to the extent 
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Heidegger’s understanding of ‘being’ remains embedded in the 
Western metaphysical tradition it is different from Zen and must be 
overcome if we are to understand the Zen concepts of mu and u (47-48, 
119), whereas, on the other hand, if Heidegger’s concept of ‘being’ is 
different from and a critique of the Western tradition it is therefore 
close to Zen (119, 134).
With regard to the first claim I shall argue that beneath the difference 
between Zen Nothingness and the Western concept of God there is an 
even more important similarity, one that is problematic if not fatal for 
Abe’s Zen critique of the Western concept of God. With regard to the 
second claim I shall argue that there is indeed a difference between 
Heidegger’s Being and Zen’s Nothingness (also Heidegger’s concept of 
time and Dogen’s concept of time), but that it is of a different sort and 
leads to a different conclusion: that to the extent Heidegger’s concept 
of Being remains embedded in the Western ontotheological tradition, 
he remains close to Abe’s Zen philosophy, whereas to the extent 
Heidegger’s concept of Being rests on a critique of Western meta­
physics, it remains far from Abe’s philosophy and indeed raises the 
counter-possibility that Abe’s understanding of mu and u must be 
overcome if we are to understand the truly radical nature of Heideg­
ger’s different way of thinking about Being.
2. “Emptiness replaces God*’
The use of the word “replaces” gives pause. If ‘Emptiness’ and 
‘God’ are irreducibly different principles, how can one be said to 
replace the other? Or, despite their difference in ontological content, 
do they share a more important underlying similarity in ontological 
function? Both are the fundamental principles in their respective 
thought-systems. The question hinges therefore not on their difference 
in content but on how Abe sees the role of the ‘Nothingness* in his Zen 
philosophy. Is it different from the logical or metaphysical role that the 
words ‘God* or ‘Being* play in Western onto-theo-logical thought? If 
not, what should we make of his critique of those Western categories? 
How does his own concept of Nothingness meet the criticism he raises 
against ‘God’ and ‘Being’? Abe’s first objection, as we have seen, is to 
what he calls the Western ascription of “ontological priority” to being 
over nonbeing: “Some Western thinkers such as Paul Tillich would in­
sist that. .. non-being is, logically and ontologically, dependent on be­
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ing and not vice versa. Hence the priority of being over non-being” 
(109). This assumption must be challenged: ‘The priority of (u) over 
(mu) non-being is not ontologically justifiable.... Herein, we see the 
essential difference in understanding the negativity of beings, including 
human existence, between the West and the East, especially as ex­
emplified in Buddhism” (ibid.). “Priority” in this context seems to 
mean for Abe the direction of the derivation of one concept from 
another. Tillich’s comments imply what Abe calls a “one-sided deriva­
tion” of nonbeing (mu) from being (w), nonbeing (mu) being the one­
sided negation of being (w). Tillich himself says: “Nonbeing is depen­
dent on the being it negates” (Courage to Be, 40). There seems to be a 
logical necessity at work here: “There would be no negation if there 
was no preceding affirmation to be negated” (ibid.)
Abe asks, cogently, what sort of ontological justification is that? 
Even semantically what sense does it make? For Abe
mu is not a negative form of u (being) and is not, like me on 
or non-being, one-sidedly derived through a negation of u. Be­
ing the complete counter-concept to u, mu is a more powerful 
form of negation than ‘non-being’. In other words, mu is on 
equal footing with and is reciprocal to u. Accordingly, it can 
both be said that mu is the negation of w, and also that u is the 
negation of mu. But if mu is absolutized in principle, it can 
transcend and embrace within itself both u and mu in their rel­
ative senses. The Buddhist idea of Emptiness may be taken as 
Mu in this absolute sense. (94)
It is this Emptiness which replaces Tillich’s Being. This enables us to 
understand not only Abe’s critique of the Western one-sided or 
dualistic concept of Being, but also his description of, for example, 
Nagarjuna’s standpoint of absolute Nothingness “which transcends 
both being and non -being” (86), or his claim that “not relative mu but 
absolute Mu, i.e. true Sunyata, is central and must be actualized if 
ultimate Reality, wondrous Being, is to be disclosed. .. . absolute Mu 
and ultimate Reality are totally identical, although the realization of 
the former is indispensable for the realization of the latter” (130). 
Thus, Abe concludes:
the difference between Western intellectual traditions and
95
DEAN
Buddhism in their respective understandings of ‘Being’ as the 
ultimate Reality depends on whether or not the realization of 
absolute Mu is essential for its disclosure and whether or not 
relative mu (non-being) is understood as completely equal 
and reciprocal to relative u (being), (ibid.)
Two questions come to mind: (1) Is Abe correct in his criticism of the 
Western assertion of the priority of being over nonbeing (in the case of 
Tillich, for example)? Is it true that the Western onto-theo-logical tradi­
tion lacks a concept of ultimate being as dependent for its disclosure on 
the concept of absolute Nothingness, a concept in whose absolute sense 
the relative senses of both being and nonbeing are simultaneously 
transcended and embraced? Taking only the case cited by Abe, it is not 
immediately clear that Tillich fails this test. For Tillich also says in the 
same work cited by Abe:
Certainly one can describe being in terms of non-nonbeing [as 
the negation of a negation, a move often used by Abe]; and 
we can justify such a description by pointing to the 
astonishing prerational fact that there is something and not 
nothing. On could say that “being is the negation of the 
primordial night of nothingness.” But in so doing one must 
realize that such an aboriginal [i.e., absolute, beyond both rel­
ative being and relative nonbeing] nothing would be neither 
nothing [relative non being] nor something [relative being, an 
‘objectified something’]. .. {Courage to Be, 40)
Earlier in the same text Tillich says: “if being is interpreted in terms of 
life or process or becoming, non-being is ontologically as basic as be­
ing. The acknowledgment of this fact does not imply a decision about 
the priority of being over nonbeing, but it requires a consideration of 
nonbeing in the very foundation of ontology” (ibid., 32). Finally, 
noting that all talk about absolute Being or absolute Nothingness is 
symbolic or metaphorical, Tillich says, “If one is asked how nonbeing 
is related to being itself, one can only answer metaphorically: being 
‘embraces’ itself and nonbeing” (ibid., 34).
Tillich’s statements are striking in light of Abe’s critique of Tillich 
and his own descriptions of Nothingness and the relation of being and 
nonbeing within the concept of absolute Nothingness. What strikes 
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one are not the differences but the similarities. First, it is not true that 
Tillich is unwilling to consider a way of approaching the relation of be­
ing and nonbeing that looks very much like Abe’s: taken in the ab­
solute sense, Tillich says, we could just as well start with absolute 
Nothingness (“aboriginal nothing”), transcending the relative senses 
of being and nonbeing, and within which the subsequent differentia­
tion of (relative) being and (relative) nonbeing takes place. Tillich 
would seem clearly to be drawing on the tradition of Western, especial­
ly German, mysticism, for example, Meister Eckhart, in such pro­
nouncements. Second, it is also not true that Tillich is unable or unwill­
ing to conceive of nonbeing as ontologically as basic as (“completely 
equal and reciprocal”), not prior to, being, and as equally involved in 
the foundation of ontology—again, within an absolute sense of Being 
as transcending and “embracing” both (relative) being and (relative) 
nonbeing. Where does this leave the fundamental difference between 
Tillich and Abe? It is not immediately so clear.
(2) This leads to a second question. Given the “completely equal and 
reciprocal” relationship of (relative) being and (relative) nonbeing, 
why is it to be concluded that absolute Mu is ontologically prior to ab­
solute U? Though they are said to be “completely non-dualistic”, that 
is, “totally identical”, nonetheless Abe insists that, in contrast to 
Western thinking about Being, for Zen philosophy absolute Mu is 
logically and ontologically prior to absolute U: “the realization of the 
former is indispensable for the realization of the latter” (130). Again: 
“absolute Afw, i.e. true Sunyata* is central and must be actualized if 
ultimate Reality, wondrous Being, is to be disclosed” (ibid). Abe 
nowhere indicates that the reverse might be equally and reciprocally 
true.
If Mu and U, taken in their absolute and not relative sense, are “com­
plete non-dualistic”, “totally identical”, why are they not, like their 
relative counterparts, also “completely equal and reciprocal”? Why 
cannot it just as truthfully be said: absolute U “is indispensable for the 
realization of’ absolute Mu? Why does Abe appear to reinstate, at the 
level of these absolute notions, a new ontological priority, a new “one­
sided derivation”? Since the logic of his critique of the Western tradi­
tion and of his Zen alternative would seem to require a more reciprocal 
(‘non-dualistic’) assertion here, the only explanation I can give is that it 
is necessary for his case against the “ontological priority over Being 
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over Non being’* in the West to represent his own position in what ap­
pears to be an equally one-sided way. A more felicitous expression in 
the context of a genuine dialogue or “two-way” exchange between Abe 
and Tillich would be to say that at the level of such ‘absolutes’, the 
‘derivation’ or ‘priority’ can go either way, “equally and reciprocal­
ly’’. They are both non-dual ways of “saying the same”, something 
like: “Absolute Mu and absolute U are completely non-dualistic, total­
ly identical, equal and reciprocal: the realization of one is, non-dually 
and completely reciprocally, the realization of the other: the realization 
of the latter is the realization of the former”. Or, to put it in a Heideg- 
gerian orthography: “absolute Mu:absolute t/:: absolute l/:absolute 
Mm”.
We can now discuss the fuller implications of Abe’s claim, “Emp­
tiness replaces God”. Just as “Mu replaces U” can be taken not as 
reversing the priority of U over Mu, but as clarifying the logic of U by 
bringing it closer to the logic of Mu, so, I shall argue, if Emptiness 
“replaces” God, it does so in by reinstating ‘God’ closer to the logic 
and ontology of Nothingess. But, to further the paradox, at the same 
time it draws the logic of Emptiness closer to, not further away from, 
the logic of God. If Emptiness “replaces” God, it perhaps does so for 
reasons other, and in ways different, than Abe may have had in mind. 
“Replacement” takes the form not of one-way critique and overcom­
ing but of two-way dialogue and mutual transformation.
According to Abe, Buddhism asks a fundamental question of 
Western notions of God, one to which he sees no adequate answer for­
thcoming. Insofar as Buddhism provides an answer to that question, 
or more precisely, insofar as for Buddhism the question does not arise 
in the first place, the problematic assumptions which give rise to the 
concept of God having been already overcome, it can rightly be said 
that the Buddhist concept of Emptiness replaces the Western concept 
of God (167). How is that for Buddhism the concept of God, like Be­
ing, is said to be ontologically unjustifiable? To those familiar with the 
traditional Buddhist attack on the concept of self-existent being 
(svabhava, u) and its “replacement” of that concept with the concept 
of anatman (no-self, i.e., no self-existent being), or later, Sunyata (ab­
solute nothingness, mu), it is clear what that unanswerable question 
must be. “Nothing whatsoever is independent or self-existing” (188). 
“Everything without exception is dependent on something else” (ibid.).
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But according to the Western concept, “Because God is the self-ex­
isting deity, God can or does exist by himself without depending on 
anything else” (ibid.). But this raises Buddhism's basic question:
How is God’s self-existence possible? What is the ground of 
God’s self-existence?. ... From a Buddhist point of view this 
idea of a self-sustaining God is ultimately inadequate, for 
Buddhists cannot see the ontological ground of this one and 
self-sustaining God. (188-189)
Abe is right. The problem this question raises for the Western tradi­
tion, given the logic of the term 'God’ in that tradition, is absolutely 
unanswerable. However, I would draw the opposite conclusion. For ex­
actly the same question can be raised of the Buddhist concept of 
Nothingness, and it would prove similarly unanswerable. One of the 
features of the logic or concept of God is that it is, as it were, the final 
word on things metaphysical or theological. “Why” questions, 
“what’’ questions, run out at that point. It is not a scandal against 
reason that no “answer” can be given to the “question”, “what is the 
ground of God’s being?” The scandal would lie rather in thinking that 
such a question was appropriate to ask in the first place: “When the 
answer cannot be put into words, neither can the question be put into 
words” (Wittgenstein, Tract atus 6.5). What looks like a genuine ques­
tion is only a pseudo-question, because the term ‘God’, though it looks 
like an answer to a question, is rather a pointer to the fundamental 
mystery of being. The mystery of being (the mystery of the ‘ground’ of 
being or of God’s being) is not a puzzle demanding an explanation, 
and the term ‘God’ is not an answer to such a demand. It functions 
rather to keep us open to ‘wondrous* being.
If we persist in trying to ask the question nonetheless, the only 
“answer”—and it is an adequate “answer” under these logically 
peculiar circumstances, is: “because God just is, that’s all.” If asked, 
therefore, “How is God’s self-existence possible? What is the ground 
of God’s self-existence?”, one could, “in answer to the question 
‘why’, respond with ‘it is so without why’ or “it is just as it is’.” This 
would not be a failure to answer, much less a scandal to reason:
It is not a negative answer in the sense of abandoning inquiry 
into the ‘why’. It is rather a positive and affirmative answer 
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which is realized within a thoroughgoing inquiry into ‘why* 
and reached by breaking through the question ‘why’. In 
short, the. .. answer ‘without why’ does not signify 
agnosticism as the mere absence of a positive answer to the 
question ‘why’, but, rather, indicates a great affirmation of 
Reality which cannot be analyzed by the question ‘why’ and 
hence is beyond it.
This statement seems, in the light of what we have just observed of the 
concept of God above, to be a perfectly adequate answer to the ques­
tion, “What is the ground of God’s being?” If we hold to the logic of 
the concept of God, there is nothing further that can or need be said 
(Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 6.5, 6.51, 7). The source of this “answer” 
quoted above? Abe himself, explaining why it is that such questions 
come to an end vis-a-vis the ultimate concepts of Buddhism such as 
Emptiness or Nothingness, the ultimate “as-it-is-ness” or “suchness” 
of all things (248)!
3. Abe and Heidegger on ‘Being’ and ‘Nothingness’.
The striking similarity, despite apparent differences, between Abe’s 
concept of Nothingness and Western concepts of Being and God now 
suggests, in light of Heidegger’s radical critique of the Western no­
tions, that Abe’s critique of Heidegger’s concept of Being needs to be 
rethought as well. It also suggests the possibility of a genuine counter­
critique of Abe’s Zen philosophy of absolute Nothingness from the 
standpoint of Heidegger’s thinking about Being. To the extent that 
Abe’s critique of Western thought still moves, as I have argued, within 
an ontotheological understanding of the meaning of being, Heidegger, 
in his critique of that understanding of being, remains far from, not 
close to, Abe’s Zen philosophy. Abe has suggested that one outcome of 
the Zen dialogue with Western thought is that Western thought might 
reexamine its traditional notions of Being and God (120). A further out­
come of a Zen dialogue with Heidegger might be for Zen philosophy to 
reexamine its understanding of the traditional Buddhist doctrine of ab­
solute Nothingness.
That Heidegger’s understanding of Being is not only not close to 
Abe’s Zen understanding of Being, but represents an entirely different 
way of thinking about Being than either Abe’s or traditional Western 
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ontology's may be discerned in some of Abe’s own remarks. Just as 
Abe suggests there are no equivalent terms in the Western 
philosophical vocabulary to translate Zen’s mu and u, so there seem to 
be no equivalent terms in Abe’s Zen vocabulary to translate Heideg­
ger’s ‘Being’ and ‘Nothingness’. We see this if we look at Abe’s com­
paring of Ddgen and Heidegger. Abe sees several differences between 
DOgen’s and Heidegger’s understanding of U (Being) and mu (nonbe­
ing). For DOgen, unlike for Heidegger, there is no ontological 
difference between Being (Sein) and beings (Seiendes): “not because he 
is unaware of the essential differences between Being and beings, but 
simply because he deliberately denies the idea of Sein, which is apt to 
be considered something substantial, as ontologically distinguished 
from Seiendes9 * (47). Abe interprets Heidegger’s Being (Sein) as referr­
ing to a ‘something’, a something ‘outside’ of all beings (Seiendes), 
whereas for Ddgen:
All beings are .. . just all beings, no more, no less; nothing is 
outside of them. For all beings, there is no possibility even for 
ontological difference. All beings are really and absolutely all 
beings—through the mediation of nothing. This is precisely 
the meaning of ‘All beings are the Buddha nature’, (ibid.) In 
Ddgen it is “Seiendes als solches (beings as such) which must 
appear as nothing in order to be”, whereas for Heidegger, 
“Sein selbst (Being itself) or Sein als solches (Being as such).. 
. must be held down into nothingness; it must appear as 
nothing, in order to be” (ibid.).
Thus, for Ddgen, far from there being an ontological difference be­
tween ‘Being’ (Buddha nature) and ‘beings’, these are simply different 
“aspects” of “one and the same living reality” (45). ‘Being’ is “what- 
it-is-that-thus-comes”; ‘all beings’ are ‘what-is-it-that-thus-comes*. 
These are simply two different ways of talking about the same ultimate 
Reality (48).
Behind these ontological assertions lie some simple linguistic facts: 
“Differing from most European languages, nouns in Chinese and 
Japanese generally make no distinction between singular and plural. 
Hence the term u can mean beings, being, or Being-itself. . .. Since the 
term u is used in this essay in contrast to mu and r/, the author, in most 
cases, uses the term without differentiating between beings, being and
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Being itself’* (281-2, n.3).
Abe interprets Heidegger’s concept of Being (as different from be­
ings) as if Heidegger were using it in an ontotheological sense as referr­
ing to something “substantial” (47), as some sort of “further embrac­
ing, deeper dimension ... the ultimate ground”, perhaps as “the place 
in which beings exist” (47). It still carries with it, unavoidably, traces 
of an “objectifying”, ‘substantializing” way of thinking. Abe con­
cludes that:
it would seem that Heidegger’s intention was rather to open 
up a new path of thinking following the traditional course of 
Western metaphysics without departing from the standpoint 
of thinking and to make the forgotten ‘Being’ present itself 
truly as ‘Being’ as such. (119)
Abe does think that Heidegger’s focus on ‘nothingness’ has “opened 
up a standpoint extremely close to Zen” (119): “Nothingness opens up 
Being itself. Again, this is strikingly similar to the Buddhist under­
standing of Emptiness” (134). To that extent perhaps Heidegger’s un­
derstanding of Being (Sein selbst, Sein als solches) is not the same as 
the traditional Western understanding of Being as the Being of beings 
(Sein des Seienden) such as found in Aristotle. But differences remain, 
so Heidegger is not yet close enough: “Only when the Heideggerian 
idea of ontological difference is overcome can DOgen’s idea of 'All 
beings are the Buddha nature* be truly understood” (48).
Abe criticizes Heidegger’s concept of Being on yet another ground. 
For Abe, Being is completely “dehomocentric”. In fact, as the most 
general or universal predicate for ‘all beings’, it is not “centric” in any 
sense. The “dimension of being” (or “being—non-being”) is not the 
dimension of “birth-death” (the human dimension) nor of “genera­
tion-extinction” (the dimension of living beings). It is the dimension of 
“appearance-disappearance” (or “being—non-being”), of “coming 
to be and ceasing to be” in a sense that applies to all beings: “the ‘be­
ing’ dimension . .. embraces everything in the universe, by transcen­
ding even the wider-than-human ‘life-centered’ horizon. Accordingly 
the ‘being’ dimension is truly boundless, free from any sort of cen­
trism, and deepest precisely in its dehomocentric nature” (35). Heideg­
ger’s Being “is not altogether freed from homocentrism” (65). Despite 
his focus on ‘nothingness’ instead of ‘substance’, Heidegger’s thinking 
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on Being via Dasein “does not necessarily lead him to the completely 
dehomocentric cosmological dimension alone in which the imper­
manence of all beings in the universe is fully realized” (67).
Is Abe correct in his depiction of Heidegger’s position? If not, what 
counter-questions might Heidegger raise for Abe?
(1) Abe’s first point, that Heidegger’s thinking of Being and the on­
tological difference between Being and beings implies a ‘substantializ­
ing’ of Being, does not comport with the way Heidegger has dealt with 
the matter. Heidegger himself is clear, as Abe has noted, that Being is 
not the Being of beings in either of the two senses Aristotle’s concept 
conveyed. The term refers neither to the highest being (cause, ground) 
of all beings nor to the most universal feature of all beings qua beings. 
It follows, therefore, that when Heidegger speaks of the ontological 
difference between Being and all beings, he is not calling attention to a 
difference between all beings and some “further embracing, deeper 
dimension .. . the ultimate ground”, or “the place in which beings ex­
ist”. Perhaps because of the inevitability of misunderstandings of his 
language about ‘Being’ reflected in even as careful a reader as Abe, 
Heidegger gave up the term ‘Being’, preferring instead Ereignis (im­
possible to translate, but containing such notions as ‘event’ and ‘own­
ness’—openings for dialogue with ‘dependent co-origination’ and ‘true 
Self?)
Abe himself draws a distinction between ‘being’ (‘beings’, ‘all be­
ings’?) in the relative sense (w) and ‘Being* (‘wondrous Being’) in the ab­
solute sense (U). There is some sort of ‘ontological difference’ here, 
some reason for making this distinction, and yet Abe considers this ‘on­
tological difference* perfectly compatible with the dialectically intrigu­
ing assertion that ‘Buddha nature’ is ‘all beings’. The “relation” be­
tween U (or Mu) and both u and mu is formulated as follows:
Thus true Emptiness is wondrous Being, absolute (7, the 
fullness and suchness of everything, or tathata\ it is ultimate 
Reality which, being beyond u and mu, lets both u and mu 
stand and work just as they are in their reciprocal relation­
ship. (128)
Does this mean Abe thinks of absolute U as some “further embracing, 
deeper dimension ... the ultimate ground ... the place in which be­
ings exist‘? If so, is he not guilty of the charge he brings against Heideg­
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ger? If not, it is not clear that Heidegger’s thinking about Being and 
the ontological difference is any more guilty of these charges.
Again, Abe states the relation between ‘Buddha nature’ and ‘all be­
ings’ as follows: The ‘Buddha nature’ is understood as the ‘what’ in 
‘what-is-it-that-thus-comes’, and ‘all beings’ as the ‘thus’: “when 
DOgen says the essence of ‘All beings are the Buddha-nature’ is well ex­
pressed in the words ‘What-is-it-that-thus-comes’, all beings appear in 
this sense of ‘thus’. And the very fact that all beings ‘thus’ appear from 
‘What* indicates ‘All beings are the Buddha-nature’ ” (48). Should we 
conclude from the substantializing grammar of these remarks that the 
‘What’ is a kind of ‘something’, ‘the ultimate ground’, from which 
‘all beings’ appear? If so, is Abe guilty of the charge he brings against 
Heidegger? At the very least it would seem there is room for more 
dialogue here than Abe’s reading of Heidegger suggests.
(2) Abe’s second criticism of Heidegger thinking on Being is that 
it is ‘homocentric’, not ‘cosmological’ or ‘dehomocentric’. It has not 
yet reached the universal ‘being-dimension’ of ‘appearance-disap­
pearance’ (‘being—nonbeing’). Here, too, Abe may not only have 
misread Heidegger, but opened himself to a Heideggerian critique. 
Abe*s remarks are added evidence of his traditional reading of the term 
‘being’, this time in Aristotle’s second sense as referring to the most 
universal features of being qua being, the ‘being’ of ‘beings’ (Sein des 
Seienden). But Heidegger’s ‘destruction’ of the onto-theo-logical un­
derstanding ‘being’ was directed against just such a view of being as the 
most universal, all-embracing feature of beings. He aimed to expose 
the abstract, derivative character of the notion of being as the ‘being’ 
of ‘beings’ by going behind it to its roots in a more primordial (and 
radically temporal) meaning of being. Here too there may be a need for 
Abe to reexamine the presuppositions of his interpretation of being, 
perhaps to put to it the same critical questions that Heidegger has put 
to the Western concept.
VII
Abe’s reading of Heidegger’s thinking about Being, in my judgment, 
points to some unresolved difficulties in his Zen philosophy that Abe 
himself admits remain outstanding.
The problem begins, according to Zen, with “the natural human ten­
dency to objectify and substantialize everything’’ (43), “the stubborn 
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innate tendency toward duality” (165)—in other words, the subject-ob­
ject duality of ‘ego-self*-consciousness which differentiates things and 
ourselves from one another. This phenomenon is not accidental to 
human self-consciousness; it is “inherent in its structure.” It is this ten­
dency to see things in terms of the subject-object structure of con­
sciousness which is overcome in realization of true Self, that absolute 
Activity or Subjectivity which is “the root-source of one’s objectifica­
tion in terms of the consciousness or intellect” (73). The true Self in 
turn “has no further root and yet is most active and creative as the 
source of one’s objectification” (ibid.).
Precisely here too, from a Heideggerian perspective, is where the 
point of difficulty lies, but with a different twist. For it is the Zen under­
standing of the inherent subject-object structure of human con­
sciousness which is itself, from a Heideggerian point of view, highly 
problematic. Nowhere does Abe provide an explanation of how or why 
the subject-object structure of consciousness arises out of this more 
primordial, ‘pure’, ‘undifferentiated’, ‘absolute’ activity of true Self. 
Such answers as are hinted at are transparently circular; they either beg 
the question or prejudge the outcome. It is the ego-self that is said to be 
“the basis of discrimination” (6). But that simply repeats the question. 
Why and how is the ego-self the source of the subject-object duality? 
What is its source? Specifically, what does it mean to say that the true 
Self is the root-source of the ego self? How and why does the ego-self 
come to be generated from the true Self? In short, what is the genesis 
of the subject-object structure of consciousness and, behind it, of the 
ego-self? So far as I can see, no answer to this question is forthcoming.
It is precisely the answer to this question—the question of the genesis 
of subject-object consciousness and, with it, the understanding of the 
meaning of being in the Western metaphysical tradition, insofar as it 
originated in that particular structure of consciousness—that Heideg­
ger tried to provide in Being and Time. The all-important difference is 
that Heidegger understands subject-object consciousness, taken by 
Abe as “inherent” in the structure of human consciousness, to be a sec­
ondary phenomenon derived from the more fundamental, non-sub­
ject-object structure of what he calls “being-in-the-world”. On the 
basis of this analysis, Heidegger is able to show how and why the struc­
ture of subject-object consciousness arises out of our everyday way of 
being-in-the-world. This deconstructs the traditional onto-theo-logical 
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appeal to a transcendental activity of “absolute Subjectivity or Self* 
to account for the genesis or “innate tendency” of the subject-object 
structure of consciousness.
One of the virtues of Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein and being-in- 
the-world is that he is not forced to rely on ontological predicates 
formed by negating the terms normally used to talk about ‘subjects’, 
‘objects’ and the ‘self. Abe’s characterization of true Self, on the 
other hand, when it doesn’t use positive terms from the vocabulary of 
the subject-object distinction itself, like ‘self, thinking to have over­
come the ontologically problematic status of such vocabulary by ab­
solutizing the sense of the term (thus 'true Self’), instead employs terms 
based on the negation (or double negation) of the corresponding 
positive terms. True thinking is ‘non-thinking’, true realization is ‘non­
objectifying’, etc. Heidegger sees these linguistic-conceptual moves as 
remaining embedded in the modes of metaphysical discourse they osten­
sibly overcome. They are linguistic clues that a genuine explanation of 
the genesis of ‘subject-object consciousness* has still not been provid­
ed.
I wish to suggest, therefore, that a more radical reading of Heideg­
ger’s philosophy than Abe provides might, paradoxically, provide 
Abe with the conceptual resources for a more satisfactory phenomeno­
logical-ontological, and Zen, account of the rise of subject-object 
consciousness.
One of the first benefits to a Zen philosophy might be a more positive 
characterization of ordinary human consciousness than is available 
to an analysis that sees such awareness as inherently structured by a 
subject-object dualism. Heidegger’s Daseinsanalytik would enable 
a Zen understanding of human consciousness to distinguish, as does 
Heidegger, between the subject-object structure of consciousness, as 
a secondary or derivative existential-ontological phenomenon, and 
the more fundamental existential-ontological structural phenomenon 
of being-in-the-world which, on a Heideggerian analysis at least, is not 
structured by the dualism of subject-object. While Heidegger makes a 
further distinction between inauthentic and authentic modes of being- 
in-the-world, nevertheless this opens the possibility for Zen philosophy 
to give a more positive account of ordinary human consciousness than 
it has hitherto been able to do so long as it equated ordinary human 
consciousness with subject-object thinking.
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I introduce this possibility because Abe himself suggests that a more 
positive estimate of human consciousness is one of those areas in which 
a Zen philosophy needs to “internally embrace the standpoints of 
Western ‘Being* and ‘Ought* which have been foreign to itself* (120). 
Abe says of Zen:
It is rather based on a fundamental critique of the nature of 
thinking asserting that human thinking is essentially a substan­
tive one. However, when Zen thus rejects thinking, does not 
Zen abandon human thinking without fully realizing its 
positive aspects which in the ancient Greek and the Western 
world broadly considered have been developed in the fields of 
knowledge of nature, mathematics, science, law, morality, 
etc.? In Zen, the positive and creative aspects of human think­
ing have been neglected and only its dualistic and discrimina­
tive aspects have been clearly realized as something to be 
overcome.. .. Essentially, the standpoint of Non-thinking 
should be able to be said to have the possibility of giving 
life to the positive aspects of human thinking which have been 
developed in the West. But this possibility has not yet been ac­
tualized. Precisely the actualization and existentialization of 
this possibility must be the theme of the future for the stand­
point of the true ‘Emptiness’ of the Eastern tradition. (112)
Abe cites two types of thinking in particular where the Zen tradition’s 
negative account of ‘thinking’ could benefit from further dialogue with 
Western philosophical accounts:
Logic and scientific cognition based on substantive objective 
thinking, and moral principles and ethical realization based 
on Subjective practical thinking, have been very conspicuous 
in the West. In contrast to this, some of these things have 
been vague or lacking in the world of Zen .. . [Zen ‘Non­
thinking’] always harbors the danger of degenerating into 
mere not-thinking. ... that Zen today lacks the clue to cope 
with the problems of modern science, as well as individual, 
social, and international ethical questions, etc., may be 
thought partly to be based on this. (119-120)
Consequently, says Abe, “Zen must take up as its historical task to 
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place substantive thinking and Subjective thinking, which have been 
refined and firmly established in the Western world, within the world 
of its own Non-thinking” (120).
The problem lies in Zen’s traditionally negative view of human con­
sciousness as inherently characterized by a subect-object dualism. 
Abe’s remarks do not really break with that perception, however. They 
acknowledge the problem, but the proposed solution is to somehow in­
corporate (rather than exclude) the subject-object way of thinking 
within a still unexamined notion of ultimate ‘Non-thinking’. I suspect, 
as Heidegger’s Daseinsanalytik and alternative way of thinking about 
being suggest, that the effort to reconcile subject-object thinking and 
Non-thinking will call for a more radical rethinking of both terms of 
that relationship: of subject-object thinking in terms of a more fun­
damental mode of being-in-the-world from which its genesis can be ex­
plained, and of Non-thinking in terms of a reexamination of the im­
plicit onto-theo-logical understanding of being which it seems to 
presuppose.
VIII
So far this discussion has been cast solely in terms of a philosophical 
dialogue, a dialogue between Zen philosophy and Western thought. 
But before Zen is philosophy and beyond any philosophy that Zen may 
embrace, Zen is first and foremost a matter of religion. Its primary con­
cern is the “realization” of the existential-soteriological “truth” of 
our lives. We need to consider what bearing this distinction has on our 
dialogue.
Abe supports the claim that there is such a thing as Zen philosophy 
distinct from the experience of Zen realization: “while in practice, Zen 
expresses and lives this philosophy in a non-philosophical, vivid, and 
direct way, the philosophical basis is never lacking” (xxi). While Zen is 
more than, and in the first instance other than philosophy, it does not 
exclude philosophy. In fact, it is implicitly grounded in a philosophy: 
“Although Zen transcends human intellect, it does not exclude it.... 
[Zen] includes a most profound philosophy, although Zen itself is not 
a philosophy” (23-24). Abe feels, rightly, that it is important to stress 
this point in order to correct a misunderstanding of Zen as “an anti-in­
tellectualism, a cheap intuitionism, or an encouragement to animal-like 
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spontaneity without consideration of good and evil” (xxi; see also 23- 
24).
It is nevertheless true that Zen’s primary concern is to grasp “the liv­
ing Reality of life which can not be entirely captured only by intellec­
tual analysis” (23). It aims to bring about a “radical and fundamental 
change of the basic mode of being of the self’ (12). In other words, 
Zen’s first concern is existential-transformative or “soteriological”, not 
cognitive-epistemological or “metaphysical”. It is first of all refigion, 
and only secondarily philosophy.
This distinction, however, brings with it a problem. It can give rise to 
confused way of speaking, what might be called a “mixed” mode of 
discourse, in which the two different senses are not clearly distinguish­
ed. Statements that may be ontological in form and thus appear to be 
metaphysical assertions may in fact be functioning in an entirely 
different way as existential or soteriological assertions instead. To prop­
erly understand them, it is important to know whether what appear to 
be metaphysical assertions (for example, statements about the on­
tological structure of subject-object consciousness) are really such, or 
whether they are soteriological assertions in ontological disguise (for ex­
ample, statements which reflect an existential transformation of con­
sciousness). Despite his clear-cut distinction between Zen as a religion 
and Zen as a philosophy, some of Abe’s “ontological” assertions seem 
to me examples of this problematic, mixed mode of speech:
(1) Abe speaks of self-estrangement and anxiety as being “not 
something accidental to the ego-self, but [as] inherent to its structure” 
(6). What kind of “structure” are we talking about? Is it an on­
tological structure, an a priori or necessary aspect of the metaphysical 
makeup of human beings? Or is it an existential “structure” in the 
sense of a concrete mode or way of being a human being—for example, 
the ‘subject-object’ way (cf. Heidegger’s ‘inauthentic’ existence) as op­
posed to the ‘true Self way (cf. Heidegger’s ‘authentic’ existence)? If 
the former, ‘guilt* and ‘self-estrangement* must be given a rather 
different, ontological interpretation, and cannot, as metaphysically 
necessary aspects of human being, be “overcome” by transformations 
of our existential mode of being. Rather, as Heidegger demonstrates in 
Being and Time, they will constitute the ontological grounds for the 
possibility of a variety of concrete, existential ways of being—from 
angst to enlightenment. If the latter, then ‘guilt’ and ‘self-estrange- 
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menf, while tautologically “inherent” in, because descriptive features 
of, what is meant by “ego-self” (again, cf. Heidegger’s “inauthentic 
existence”), are not inherent in being a human being as such, and 
Abe’s ontological-looking assertion loses much of its impact.
(2) Abe speaks of the “non-objective, non-conceptual, existential” 
nature and understanding of the ultimate reality and truth of which 
Zen philosophy speaks: “This paradoxical identity of the individual 
and the absolute cannot be fully understood objectively, but only non- 
objectively and existentially” (19). “True Emptiness and true fullness 
are dialectically one in a non-conceptual, existential way” (21). What 
kind of statements are these? Their appearance is certainly dramatic. 
They appear to give with one hand—ontological information—what 
they take away with the other—you can’t understand them ontological­
ly, only existentially. In one sense there is a profound truth at work 
here—actually a profound truism or tautology: you can’t fully unders­
tand an experience intellectually. The problem is that this is true not 
just for the Zen realization of Mu, but for the taste of tea as well 
(though perhaps Abe would say these are, ultimately, nondually, the 
same). Thus one needs to ask: apart from the apparent ontological 
character of such statements, what is their existential function? Can we 
give a deontologized, existential reinterpretation of these peculiar ut­
terances about the non-objective, non-conceptual nature of Zen truth?
As noted above, Zen’s main concern is to bring about a “radical and 
fundamental change of the basic mode of being of the self’ (12). The 
existential concern of Zen is with our basic mode of being, specifically 
the two modes of being designated by the quasi-ontological but func­
tionally existential terms: ‘ego-self and ‘true Self (again: compare 
Heidegger’s discussion of ‘inauthenticity* and ‘authenticity’ as Da- 
sein’s two “basic modes of being”). This existential rather than on­
tological reading of ego-self and true-Self as terms pointing to two 
different “ways of existing' ’ rather than two different “structures of be­
ing'9 provides a hermeneutical basis for an existential reading of Abe’s 
ontological-looking assertions.
Take, for example, Ddgen’s “All beings are the Buddha-nature” 
(39). This looks like an ontological assertion. But its existential func­
tion is very different. It serves to point to a transformation in our way 
of seeing ‘all beings’, that is, in our way of being in the world— from 
the existential perspective of the self-absorbed, self-alienated, estrang-
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ed, anxious ‘ego-self way of existing to the enlightened, liberated, 
non-attached ‘true-Self way of existing. In this existential interpreta­
tion of Abe’s ontological assertions, ego-self and true-Self (or Buddha- 
nature) do not function as ontological referring terms but as existential 
qualifiers of modes of human existence. It is not as if the metaphysical 
differentiation of ‘mountains’ and ‘waters’, ‘all beings’, ‘others’, and 
‘myself suddenly disappear into undifferentiated ontological 
sameness. Rather, as Abe himself allows: “the distinctions between 
self and other, good and evil, life and death, are regrasped in the 
realization of suchness” (227). The ‘suchness’, the ‘what thus comes’, 
of ‘all beings’ is not some universal ontological quality they all share; it 
is a transformed way of “seeing” all beings, a transformation of our 
“basic mode of being” in the world.
The existential-functional rather than ontological-descriptive nature 
of these Zen “philosophical” assertions become particularly clear 
when we give in to the temptation, by mis-taking them as metaphysical 
statements, of asking further questions about such phenomena as ‘Bud­
dha-nature’, ‘true Self, ‘absolute Mu', or ‘What-thus-comes*. I have 
already alluded to this fact in challenging the legitimacy of Abe’s Bud­
dhist questions about the ‘ground’ of God’s ‘self-existence’, suggesting 
that the concept of God here functions more like an anti-concept, an 
ultimate limiting notion that puts an end to a certain line of ontological 
questioning and instead confronts us existentially with an awareness of 
the ultimate mystery of being. Abe seems to be saying something 
similar in his characterization (and refusal) of ontological-looking 
‘Why’ and ‘What’ questions directed at basic Buddhist anti-concepts 
like ‘Nothingness* or ‘Buddha-nature’:
Accordingly, an interrogative such as ‘what’ or ‘whence’ does 
not represent the Buddha-nature.. .. This being so, the ques­
tion ‘What is it that thus comes?’ is totally a question, and the 
word ‘what’ is also thoroughly an interrogative. Yet, at the 
same time ‘what’ is not a sheer interrogative, but is the Bud­
dha-nature. Again ‘What-is-it-that-thus-comes’ is not a mere 
question, but is a realization of the Buddha-nature. (38)
In other words, the use of negatives, affirmatives, and interrogatives in 
the context of ‘assertions’ about Buddha-nature, true Self, and other 
such terms (and, I would say, about God) is not an ontologically 
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descriptive or referential use of language—it is not a matter of 
metaphysical propositions. Rather it is a performative or existential use 
of language—it is a matter of soteriological transformatives.
Nevertheless, the distinction between the language of religion and 
the language of philosophy and the attempt to provide an existential- 
soteriological or deontologized reading of the latter on behalf of the 
former does not mean a return to a kind of existential-religious anti-in­
tellect ualism or anti-metaphysics. On this point Abe is surely right. 
There is still a need for philosophical analysis and ontological descrip­
tion in order to clarify the nature and implicit presuppositions of Zen’s 
existential “realization”:
Authentic Zen realization or satori, even should it undergo 
rigorous intellectual analysis and philosophical reflection, will 
never be destroyed; on the contrary, analysis will serve to 
clarify that realization and confirm it more definitively in 
oneself, further enabling one to convey the depth of that 
realization to others, even through the medium of words. (23)
Zen realization needs Zen philosophy. On the other hand, Zen 
philosophy needs Zen realization. For it is only by returning to the 
roots of its own ‘non-thinking’ in Zen experience that Zen philosophy 
can shed light on the otherwise paradoxical-sounding utterances of 
traditional Zen texts:
Once we come to this existential realization, we can say with 
justification that samsara and nirvana are identical. Thus the 
realization of the Great Death is the crucial point for the 
seemingly paradoxical Mahayana doctrines. (166).
This point is of fundamental importance for the dialogue between Zen 
philosophy and Western thought. It is Zen experience, rather than any 
Western philosophical conceptuality, on which Zen philosophy must 
finally draw in its dialogue with the West.
This is particularly important if, as Abe contends, it is not the 
philosophical concepts of Nothingness, Being, Ought or God, but the 
differing ‘experience of Being’ from which the concepts of these two 
traditions are drawn, which is the source of the fundamental differ­
ences between Zen and Western thought. Behind the apparently ir­
reducible differences between the metaphysical concepts of Nothing­
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ness and Being lie deeper, existential-soteriological differences in the 
experiences of the problematic nature of human existence and its ap­
propriate modes of transformation or overcoming: “The difference 
between Western intellectual traditions and Buddhism in their under­
standing of negativity in human life involves not only an ontological 
issue but also an existential and soteriological one” (131).
The dialogue between Zen philosophy and Western thought, 
therefore, requires not simply continued reflection on the level of com­
parative ontology, but also a step back to the experiences of Being and 
Nothingness that underlie their ontologies. By taking a fresh look at 
their originary experiences and searching for new philosophical 
methods and vocabularies to articulate them, these traditions will sure­
ly discover new possibilities for dialogue between East Asian and 
Western ways of experiencing and bringing to language what must 
ultimately remain a mystery.. .
Absolute Nothingness:Wondrous Being:: Mu:U.
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